Democracy and Deference
In U.S. v. Skrmetti, the United States Supreme Court will determine whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1, which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity,” violates the Equal Protection Clause.
On December 4, 2024, the Court held oral argument, and the attorneys for Petitioner and Respondent presented strong arguments. Among the issues under consideration is whether the prohibition on gender-affirming care discriminates based on age or sex, the latter of which would require heightened scrutiny under the Court’s jurisprudence. Petitioner and Respondent’s attorneys also presented competing arguments regarding, among other things, the benefits and harms that upholding Tennessee Bill 1 would engender. In so doing, the justices acknowledged that both sides presented compelling arguments and that reasonable people could disagree on whether Tennessee Bill 1 furthered legitimate and salutary purposes.
Given this fact, a few justices questioned why the Court, rather than the legislature, should resolve this issue through the democratic process. For example, during oral argument, Justice Kavanaugh stated:
I want to ask about our role here and pick up on the Chief Justice’s questions at the beginning, who decides. You’ve put forth forceful policy arguments to allow these medical treatments, and Justice Sotomayor’s questions elaborated on that. But the 20-plus states on the other side put forth very forceful arguments against allowing these medical treatments for minors. So it seems to me that we look to the Constitution, and the Constitution doesn’t take sides on how to resolve that medical and policy debate. The Constitution’s neutral on the question. At least that’s one way to look at it. I want to get your reaction to that. You know, if the Constitution doesn’t take sides, if there’s strong, forceful scientific policy arguments on both sides in a situation like this, why isn’t it best to leave it to the democratic process?[1]
As Justice Kavanaugh stated, “[y]ou say there are benefits from allowing these treatments,” but given that “there are also harms … how do we as a Court choose which set of risks is more serious in deciding whether to constitutionalize this whole area?”[2]
The concern that the democratic process, rather than the Court, should resolve this issue—particularly when reasonable people differ on whether the law is beneficial or harmful and where the Constitution’s text is ambiguous—will likely carry the day. If it does, the Court will rightfully embrace a principle that promotes democracy and bottom-up governance: where reasonable people can disagree about a law’s constitutionality, the democratic, not judicial, process is the proper forum to resolve policy disputes. In other words, when the Constitution’s text is broadly worded and reasonable people can interpret such text differently, the Court should defer to the democratic process. Deference is essential to democracy, the Court’s legitimacy, and the right of citizens to determine whether specific unenumerated rights should be recognized.
Unfortunately, in many instances, the Court has taken the opposite approach and issued rulings in cases that have undermined the democratic process and invalidated legislation promoting participatory democracy and addressing important economic and social issues. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court by a 5-4 margin invalidated a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that limited corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in elections.[3] In so doing, the Court overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and held that corporations enjoy First Amendment protections.[4] But what language in the First Amendment supported this holding? At the very least, reasonable people could differ on whether, for example, the First Amendment applies to corporations. As such, why didn’t the Court defer to the coordinate branches and uphold a law that sought to reduce the corrupt influence of money in politics? There is no answer—at least not a good one.
Similarly, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court considered whether a law authorizing the death penalty for child rape violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.[5] Neither the Eighth Amendment’s text nor its original purpose answered this question; at the very least, reasonable people could differ on whether such a punishment was cruel and unusual. Notwithstanding, the Court ruled 5-4 that the law violated the Eighth Amendment and thus prohibited the states from resolving this issue democratically. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court made the same error, holding that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited the execution of minors even though the Eighth Amendment could not possibly be interpreted to support this result, or the “evolving standards of decency” upon which the Court relied to reach its decision.[6]
Improvident intervention in the democratic process is the norm, not the exception, in the Court’s jurisprudence. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a Connecticut law prohibiting contraception, holding that although the Constitution’s text did not resolve this question, there existed invisible “penumbras” in the Constitution’s text that enabled the Court—and only the Court—to recognize unenumerated rights, such as the right to privacy, and thus impose its policy views on an entire nation.[7] In Roe v. Wade, the Court compounded this error by holding that the right to privacy encompassed a right to terminate a pregnancy, even though nothing in the Constitution’s text could be interpreted to support its holding.[8] To be sure, a deferential approach is not about promoting a particular political viewpoint. Whether one supports a right to abortion is irrelevant; what matters is that nine unelected judges decided that their views should remove this issue from democratic choice.
In contrast, some decisions have demonstrated appropriate deference to democratic processes. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to create a right to assisted suicide, holding that because the Constitution’s text was silent on this issue, it should be resolved democratically.[9] Additionally, in National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts cast the deciding vote upholding the Affordable Care Act, concluding that the Act’s individual mandate constituted a tax, not a penalty.[10] The primary reason underlying Roberts’ decision was arguably to preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy by deferring to the coordinate branches and avoiding a decision that appeared politically motivated. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, the Court remedied the harm that Roe caused to the Court’s legitimacy by returning the issue to the states.[11]
Of course, the Court has the power to say what the law is, but how can the Court say what the law objectively is when a constitutional provision is ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations? It cannot. In such circumstances, saying what the law is requires the justices to determine subjectively what the law should be. That is the problem. In a democracy, the people have the right to say what the law should be, not nine unelected and life-tenured justices. Thus, where the Constitution is silent or capable of reasonably different interpretations, the Court should defer to democratic choice. A court with limited power is essential for preserving democracy, and the process by which the Court makes decisions is equally, if not more, important than the outcomes it reaches.
[1] U.S. v. Skrmetti, Transcript of Oral Argument, (Dec. 4, 2024), p. 40-41, available at: 23-477_c07d.pdf
[2] Id. at 44-45.
[3] 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
[4] 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
[5] 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
[6] 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
[7] 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[8] 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[9] 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
[10] 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
[11] 597 U.S. 215 (2002).